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According to the Spirit and not to the 
Letter: Proportionality and the Singapore 
Constitution
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee*
Abstract: When interpreting the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution, courts 
presently do not engage in a proportionality analysis – that is, a consideration of whether 
limitations on rights imposed by executive or legislative action bear a rational relation with 
the object of the action, and, if so, whether the limitations restrict rights as minimally as 
possible. The main reason for this appears to be the expansive manner in which exceptions 
to the fundamental liberties are phrased, and the courts’ deferential attitude towards the 
political branches of government. This paper considers how the rejection of proportionality 
has affected the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and freedom of religion, 
and argues that although proportionality was originally a European legal doctrine, its use 
in Singapore is not only desirable but necessary if the Constitution is to be regarded as 
guaranteeing fundamental liberties instead of merely setting out privileges that may be 
abridged at will by the Government.
Keywords: Constitutional interpretation, fundamental liberties, human rights, proportion-
ality, Singapore
Few fundamental liberties that are guaranteed by bills of rights are expressed to be 
absolute. In many common law jurisdictions, the legislature is permitted to impose re-
strictions on rights for specified reasons and under particular conditions. However, con-
stitutional or bill of rights texts often do not expressly indicate how the courts should 
determine that applicants’ rights have been legitimately restricted. To this end, courts in 
jurisdictions such as Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom have adopted the 
European doctrine of proportionality, which essentially requires them to balance oppos-
ing types of public interests – the interest sought to be protected by the rights in ques-
tion, and other public interests such as national security, the protection of people’s repu-
tation and public order.
The Singapore courts currently appear averse to taking a proportionality approach in 
constitutional adjudication. This paper examines why, and argues that such an approach 
would be consonant with the text of the Constitution and would allow the courts to per-
form their role of checking executive and legislative power more effectively. Part I of the 
paper explains what a proportionality analysis involves, while Part II discusses the cur-
rent position in Singapore and the justifications for it. Thereafter, it is argued in Part III 
that despite the taciturn nature of the Singapore Constitution – the lack of terms such as 
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University (SMU). He wishes to thank Fabian Tan Yingquan, Kimberly Tan Shu Yi, Thiagesh Sugumaran 
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‘reasonable restrictions’ or ‘restrictions necessary in a democratic society’ that the courts 
might hang a proportionality analysis on to – the adoption of proportionality is consistent 
with the text and its history as well as some of the Singapore courts’ jurisprudence, and 
would avoid problems associated with the current interpretive methodology. Part IV con-
siders commensurability and the devaluation of rights, two major issues associated with 
the balancing of rights and other public interests, and submits they are not as trouble-
some as might be supposed. Part V contains concluding thoughts, and ultimately sug-
gests that the bill of rights in the Singapore Constitution should be interpreted according 
to its spirit and not to the letter.
I. Proportionality Analysis
Written constitutions that contain bills of rights generally do not express in absolute 
terms the fundamental rights therein. In other words, most rights are subject to legiti-
mate limitations on specified grounds imposed by the legislature. For example, Article 
10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights1 guarantees the right to freedom of 
expression, while Article 10(2) provides, in the following terms, that restrictions on the 
right may be imposed:
‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’
Similarly, fundamental liberties are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,2 but section 1 of the Charter states that they are subject ‘only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society’. In the presence of such limitation clauses, when a litigant presents a 
plausible argument that an activity lies within a liberty guaranteed to him or her by the 
constitution, it is incumbent on the court to consider if the government has presented 
sufficient public interest reasons showing that limitations are reasonable and propor-
tional.
Commentators have noted that the application of proportionality analysis in rights 
adjudication is now widespread, particularly in jurisdictions on the ‘new constitutional-
ism’ model. The characteristics of this model of government include (1) a written consti-
tution establishing and empowering institutions of government; (2) ultimate power 
placed in the hands of the people through regular elections or referenda; (3) the subjec-
tion of public authority to the constitution; (4) the existence of a bill of rights and a ju-
dicial review system ensuring that rights are upheld; and (5) procedures specified in the 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), ETS 5, 213 UNTS 221, given legal effect in the United 
Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), ss 1(1)–(3) read with Sch 1.
2 Pt I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), which was itself enacted as Sch B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK).
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constitution for its revision.3 Thus, in R v Oakes4 the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
a proportionality analysis was to be applied when determining if a law limiting a right 
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter could be upheld under section 1 of the Charter as 
‘reasonable’ and ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. So, too, has 
the European Court of Human Rights employed a proportionality approach to the neces-
sity clauses qualifying European Convention rights. This is evident in such cases as 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom5 which held that interference with a right cannot be regarded 
as necessary in a democratic society unless it is proportionate to a legitimate aim pur-
sued by the legal restriction in question.6 When the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)7 came 
into force in 2000, providing aggrieved persons with remedies in domestic law for 
breaches of Convention rights, the House of Lords confirmed that a proportionality anal-
ysis would be applied to necessity clauses.8
In general, adopting a proportionality approach can be said to be a four-stage pro-
cess:
i. First, there is a consideration of whether the government is legally authorized to en-
act the restrictive measure in question.
ii. Secondly, an assessment is carried out as to whether there is a rational relation be-
tween the means adopted in the measure and the stated policy objectives of the 
measure. This is often known as the test of suitability.
iii. Thirdly, the measure must be found to infringe rights as minimally as possible. This 
is known as the test of necessity.
iv. Finally, there is an examination of whether the benefits of the measure outweigh the 
costs arising from a curtailment of rights. This is often termed ‘proportionality in the 
narrow sense’.9
As might be imagined, the manner in which proportionality is applied differs slightly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.10 A detailed comparison is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Instead, I will focus on some potential difficulties with proportionality, and whether 
the approach is applicable to the bill of rights in the Singapore Constitution,11 which does 
not expressly require courts to balance the costs of limiting fundamental liberties against 
legislative goals.
3 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 
47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72, 84-85.
4 [1986] 1 SCR 103 (SC, Canada). The proportionality analysis has been refined in subsequent cases 
such as Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 (SC, Canada); and RJR-Mac-
Donald Inc v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199 (SC, Canada).
5 (1981) 4 EHRR 149.
6 Ibid 165, [53], applying Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 754, [49], and Young, 
James & Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38, 56, [63].
7 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (n 1).
8 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, 547, [27], 
citing de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1998] 
UKPC 30, [1999] 1 AC 69, 80 (PC on appeal from Antigua and Barbuda).
9 Stone Sweet and Mathews (n 3) 75-76.
10 For instance, it has been pointed out that the ECtHR does not regard the first stage as part of the 
proportionality analysis: ibid 75, n 8. The test applied by the House of Lords in Daly (n 8) omitted the 
first and fourth stages, and included before stage 2 a consideration of whether the legislative objective 
is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right. Arguably, this consideration can be 
regarded as part of stage 2 of the four-stage schema set out in the main text.
11 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Rep).
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II.  Judicial Attitudes towards Proportionality in the 
 Context of the Singapore Constitution
A. Judicial Review under the Constitution
Like many common law jurisdictions, Singapore does not have a constitutional court 
having exclusive authority to decide disputes relating to the Constitution.12 All cases 
apart from those regarded as routine13 are dealt with by the Supreme Court of Singa-
pore, which determines private law cases as well. The Supreme Court consists of the 
High Court, the superior court of first instance; and the Court of Appeal which is Singa-
pore’s highest appellate court. The latter recently reaffirmed that the nation’s Westmin-
ster-model legal system ‘is based on the supremacy of the Singapore Constitution, with 
the result that the Singapore courts may declare an Act of the Singapore parliament in-
valid for inconsistency with the Singapore Constitution and, hence, null and void’.14
However, over the years applicants have generally had little success in convincing the 
Supreme Court that their fundamental liberties guaranteed by Part IV of the Singapore 
Constitution have been infringed. This can be put down to a number of overlapping rea-
sons. For one thing, the courts hold that a ‘strong presumption of constitutional validity’15 
applies when legislation or executive action is challenged.16 The effect of the presumption 
is that the applicant does not simply establish a prima facie case in order to shift to the 
Government the evidential burden of showing that the action is constitutional, but bears 
the burden of proving that there has been ‘a clear transgression of the constitutional 
principles’. In assessing whether the presumption has been displaced, the court ‘may 
12 Art 100(1) of the Constitution provides that the President may refer to a tribunal of not less than three 
Supreme Court judges for its opinion ‘any question as to the effect of any provision of this Constitution 
which has arisen or appears to him likely to arise’. However, the President’s discretion to refer such 
matters must be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a minister acting under the 
Cabinet’s general authority: Art 21(1). In this respect, the President has no power to exercise per-
sonal discretion or act against Cabinet’s advice: cf Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 
1189, 1262, [157], and 1272, [180] (CA, Singapore) (‘Yong Vui Kong v AG’). Thus, persons may not 
have constitutional questions referred by the President to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
Tribunal as of right.
13 It has been suggested by the High Court that ‘[w]here questions of law have already been decided or 
principles relating to an article in the Constitution have been set out by the superior courts, a subor-
dinate court […] should proceed to apply the relevant case law or extrapolate from the principles 
enunciated to reach a proper conclusion on the facts before it’. Johari bin Kanadi v Public Prosecutor 
[2008] 3 SLR(R) 422, 430, [9] (HC, Singapore).
14 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947, 958, [14] (CA, Singapore). See 
also Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, 231, [50] (HC, Singapore) 
(‘Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP’) (‘The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the 
Constitution are observed. The court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legisla-
tive and executive, which exceeds the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or which 
contravenes any prohibition which the Constitution provides.’), and Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng 
Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489, 516, [89] (CA, Singapore) (‘Taw Cheng Kong (CA)’) (‘The courts, in up-
holding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily invalidate laws that derogate from the 
Constitution which is the supreme law of our land.’)
15 Taw Cheng Kong (CA), ibid 509, [60], applied in Johari bin Kanadi (n 13) 430, [10], and Lim Meng 
Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118, 162, [103] (HC, Singapore).
16 As regards executive action, see Ramalingam Ravinthran v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 49, 70, 
[43]-[44], in which the Court of Appeal held that since the Constitution vests the power to prosecute 
persons accused of crimes in the Attorney-General, this power is equal in status to the judicial power 
vested in the courts. Thus, ‘the courts should presume that the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial deci-
sions are constitutional or lawful until they are shown to be otherwise’.
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take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the 
history of the time and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing 
at the time of legislation’,17 which greatly assists the Government. In contrast, the ap-
plicant has a heavy onus to discharge:
‘[U]nless the law is plainly arbitrary on its face, postulating examples of arbi-
trariness would ordinarily not be helpful in rebutting the presumption of constitution-
ality. This is because another court or person can well postulate an equal number if 
not more examples to show that the law did not operate arbitrarily. […] Therefore, to 
discharge the burden of rebutting the presumption, it will usually be necessary for 
the person challenging the law to adduce some material or factual evidence to show 
that it was enacted arbitrarily or had operated arbitrarily.’18
In Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General,19 the High Court found that sec-
tion 377A of the Penal Code,20 which criminalizes acts of ‘gross indecency’ between male 
persons occurring in public or private, does not violate the rights to equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law guaranteed by Article 12(1) of the Constitution.21 
Among other things, the Court took the view that the applicants, a gay couple, had failed 
to displace the presumption that the provision is constitutional. They had not adduced 
‘compelling or cogent material or factual evidence’ to show that section 377A cannot 
serve the purpose of signalling disapproval of male homosexual conduct in view of the 
Government’s policy not to enforce it against consensual acts,22 that it is illegitimate 
because it targets only male and not female homosexual conduct,23 or that it is arbitrary 
or operates in an arbitrary manner.24
Particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, the courts also tended to adopt highly lit-
eral interpretations of constitutional provisions. This is aptly illustrated by Rajeevan 
Edakalavan v Public Prosecutor.25 Article 9(3) of the Constitution states that ‘[w]here a 
person is arrested, he […] shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practi-
tioner of his choice’. The issue in the case was whether arrested persons enjoy an ancil-
lary right to be informed of their right to counsel by the authorities. The High Court held 
that they do not, as Article 9(3) is silent on the matter. In its view, it would be inappropri-
ate for the Court to hold that such a right exists for the following reason:
‘Any proposition to broaden the scope of the rights accorded to the accused should 
be addressed in the political and legislative arena. The Judiciary, whose duty is to 
ensure that the intention of Parliament as reflected in the Constitution and other 
legislation is adhered to, is an inappropriate forum. The Members of Parliament are 
17 Lee Keng Guan v Public Prosecutor [1977-1978] SLR(R) 78, 86, [19] (HC, Singapore), citing Shri Ram 
Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S R Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538, 547 et seq (SC, India). Lee Keng Guan 
was cited in Taw Cheng Kong (CA) (n 14) 513, [79].
18 Taw Cheng Kong (CA), ibid 514, [80], cited in Lim Meng Suang (n 15) 163-164, [105].
19 Lim Meng Suang, ibid.
20 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
21 The High Court reached the same conclusion in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 
(HC, Singapore). As of the time of writing, appeals against the two judgments to the Court of Appeal 
were pending.
22 Lim Meng Suang (n 15) 162, [101].
23 ibid 169, [118].
24 ibid 173, [131].
25 [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 (HC, Singapore).
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freely elected by the people of Singapore. They represent the interests of the con-
stituency who entrust them to act fairly, justly and reasonably. The right lies in the 
people to determine if any law passed be [sic: by] Parliament goes against the prin-
ciples of justice or otherwise. This right, the people exercise through the ballot 
box. […] The sensitive issues surrounding the scope of fundamental liberties should 
be raised through our representatives in Parliament who are the ones chosen by us 
to address our concerns. This is especially so with regards to matters which concern 
our well-being in society, of which fundamental liberties are a part.’26
In similar vein, in Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun27 the Court of Appeal de-
clined to hold that the right to silence is a constitutional right within the scope of Article 
9(1), which states that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save 
in accordance with law’. If it did so, that would ‘elevate an evidential rule to constitu-
tional status despite its having been given no explicit expression in the Constitution. 
Such an elevation requires in the interpretation of Art 9(1) a degree of adventurous ex-
trapolation which we do not consider justified.’28
Finally, the courts have been fairly resistant to assessing the fairness or reasonable-
ness of legislation. In Jabar bin Kadermastan v Public Prosecutor,29 the Court said: ‘Any 
law which provides for the deprivation of a person’s life or personal liberty, is valid and 
binding so long as it is validly passed by Parliament. The court is not concerned with 
whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well.’30 Though the Court subsequently 
clarified in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor31 that laws must comply with fundamental 
rules of natural justice in order not to offend Article 9,32 it affirmed that the provision 
warranted no ‘fair, just and reasonable procedure’ test as this is ‘too vague a test of 
constitutionality’, and is undesirable because it ‘hinges on the court’s view of the rea-
sonableness of the law in question, and requires the court to intrude into the legislative 
sphere of Parliament as well as engage in policy making’.33
The general reluctance of the courts to exercise constitutional judicial review in fa-
vour of applicants may be explainable by the dominance of the political branches of 
government – the executive and the legislature – in the Singapore political and legal 
system. Since the People’s Action Party (PAP) swept to power in the 1959 general elec-
tion, this political party has held more than a two-thirds majority of the elected seats in 
Parliament and has formed the Government. At present, it holds 80 out of the 87 seats; 
that is, a majority of about 92%. Combined with the system of strong party discipline 
inherited from the British which ensures that PAP Members of Parliament (MPs) vote ac-
cording to the party line, the party’s overwhelming parliamentary majority guarantees 
26 ibid 19, [21].
27 [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 (CA, Singapore).
28 ibid 973, [15].
29 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 326 (CA, Singapore). See also Rajeevan Edakalavan (n 25) 19, [21]: ‘The Judiciary 
is in no position to determine if a particular piece of legislation is fair or reasonable as what is fair or 
reasonable is very subjective. If anybody has the right to decide, it is the people of Singapore.’
30 ibid 343, [52].
31 [2010] 3 SLR 489 (CA, Singapore) (‘Yong Vui Kong v PP’).
32 As stated in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979-1980] SLR(R) 710, 722, [26] (PC on appeal from 
Singapore), cited in Yong Vui Kong v PP, ibid 500-501, [17]-[18].
33 Yong Vui Kong v PP, ibid 526-527, [80].
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that it is able to enact primary legislation34 and constitutional amendments35 without 
difficulty. Thus, although in form Singapore’s legal system is based on the doctrine of 
constitutional sovereignty – a point espoused by the judiciary, as we have already seen – 
in practice elements of the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine may hold sway.36
The Chief Justice and other Supreme Court judges are not appointed by an independ-
ent judicial appointments panel. Instead, the Prime Minister nominates a candidate for 
Chief Justice to the President, who may exercise personal discretion to veto the nomina-
tion if he thinks fit.37 The President is required to consult the Council of Presidential Ad-
visers before exercising this function;38 and if, contrary to the Council’s recommendation, 
he refuses to make an appointment, the refusal may be overridden by Parliament on a 
vote of not less than two-thirds of the total number of elected MPs.39 The procedure for 
the appointment of other Supreme Court judges is the same, except that the Prime Min-
ister is also required to consult the Chief Justice before nominating candidates to the 
President.40 To date, no elected President has declined to follow the Prime Minister’s ad-
vice in appointing a judge. It is submitted that since the Government essentially steers 
the system of judicial appointment, it is unsurprising that it selects candidates who share 
its values and belief in the desirability of a strong government. There is little incentive for 
the Government to seek out candidates who disagree with this ethos.
The result is a judiciary that by and large feels the Government is better placed than 
it is to decide what is best for Singapore society. This outlook is strikingly illustrated by 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General.41 The 
appellant, who is the Secretary-General of the Reform Party, one of the political parties 
in Singapore, had applied for judicial review of the Government’s decision to grant a 
contingent loan of US$ 4 billion to the International Monetary Fund. He claimed that 
Article 144 of the Constitution, properly interpreted, required the loan to have been ap-
proved by Parliament and the President. One issue that arose was whether the appellant 
had standing to bring the claim. In an unusually philosophical judgment, the Court en-
dorsed the views of former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong given during an ex-curial 
speech given in 2010.42
Chan CJ had expressed a preference for the ‘green-light’ approach towards adminis-
trative law. In Jeyaretnam the Court explained that under this approach ‘public adminis-
tration is not principally about stopping bad administrative practices but encouraging 
good ones: “in other words, seek good government through the political process and 
34 Which requires a majority of the votes of the Members of Parliament present and voting: Constitution, 
Art 57(1).
35 Most constitutional amendments require votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of 
elected MPs on the Second and Third Readings of the constitutional amendment bill: Constitution, 
Art 5(2).
36 For a more detailed discussion, see Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo and Yvonne C L Lee, ‘Constitutional Su-
premacy: Still a Little Dicey?’ in Li-ann Thio and Kevin Y L Tan (eds), Evolution of a Revolution: Forty 
Years of the Singapore Constitution (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 153-192.
37 Constitution, Arts 22(1)(a) and 95(1).
38 ibid Art 21(3).
39 ibid Art 22(2).
40 ibid Art 95(2).
41 [2014] 1 SLR 345 (CA, Singapore).
42 Chan Sek Keong, ‘Judicial Review – From Angst to Empathy: A Lecture to Singapore Management 
University Second Year Law Students’ (2010) 22 Sing Acad LJ 469.
© Verlag Österreich
ICL Journal | Vol 8 | 3/2014 | Articles 283
public avenues rather than redress bad government through the courts.”’43 Thus, 
‘[u]nder a green-light approach, the courts can play their role in promoting the public 
interest by applying a more discriminating test of locus standi to balance the rights of the 
individual and the rights of the state in the implementation of sound policies in a lawful 
manner’.44 This was to be contrasted with the ‘red-light’ approach ‘where the courts exist 
in a combative relationship with the Executive, functioning as a check on the latter’s 
administrative powers’.45 Chan CJ had alluded to the fact that a liberal standing test 
would allow ‘too many unmeritorious cases to be fought, which could seriously curtail the 
efficiency of the Executive in practising good governance’.46 The result of the Court of 
Appeal adopting a green-light approach in the Jeyaretnam case was that the appellant 
was found not to have standing to challenge the Government’s alleged breach of the 
Constitution. He could show neither that a private right of his (such as a fundamental 
liberty guaranteed to him) had been breached, nor that a public right enjoyed by all had 
been breached and he had suffered special damage.47 Although the Court did hold that 
‘in the rare case where a non-correlative rights generating public duty is breached, and 
the breach is of sufficient gravity such that it would be in the public interest for the courts 
to hear the case, an applicant sans rights may be accorded locus standi as well, at the 
discretion of the courts’, this was not such a case because the appellant had also ‘failed 
to show that the Government had in any way breached its duties under Art 144’.48
B. Judicial Attitudes towards Proportionality
The Singapore courts’ preference for a green-light approach towards judicial review, 
which is reflected by their tendency to read the Constitution literally and their aversion 
to assessing the reasonableness of laws, explains to a large extent the current judicial 
attitude towards proportionality in constitutional interpretation. Like the Canadian Char-
ter and the European Convention, various provisions of the Singapore Constitution guar-
antee fundamental liberties to all persons (or, in some cases, to Singapore citizens),49 but 
permit legislative restrictions to be imposed for specific purposes. Articles 14(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution, for instance, read as follows:
‘14.— (1) Subject to clauses (2) and (3) —
(a) every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) all citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and without 
arms; and
(c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations.
(2) Parliament may by law impose —
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers nec-
essary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
43 Jeyaretnam (n 41) 364, [48], citing Chan, ibid 480, [29].
44 Jeyaretnam, ibid 364, [49], citing Chan, ibid 481, [34].
45 Jeyaretnam, ibid.
46 Jeyaretnam, ibid, citing Chan (n 42) 481, [33].
47 Jeyaretnam, ibid 362–364 and 371, [46]–[47] and [64].
48 Ibid 371, [64]–[65].
49 See the Constitution, Art 12(2) (prohibition of certain forms of discrimination), Art 13 (prohibition of 
banishment, and freedom of movement), Art 14 (rights to freedom of speech and expression, assem-
bly and association), and Art 16 (rights in respect of education).
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thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and 
restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide 
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence;
(b) on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it considers neces-
sary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof or public order; and
(c) on the right conferred by clause (1)(c), such restrictions as it considers neces-
sary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof, public order or morality.’
A limitation clause is also to be found in Article 15. While Article 15(1) states that 
‘[e]very person has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it’, 
clause (4) provides that the Article ‘does not authorise any act contrary to any general 
law relating to public order, public health or morality’.
One significant difference between these clauses and analogous provisions in the Euro-
pean Convention and the Canadian Charter is that the former do not contain any words sig-
nificantly qualifying the ability of the Singapore Parliament to restrict the fundamental liber-
ties in question. Thus, on a plain reading, Article 15(4) appears to permit Parliament to en-
act general laws relating to public order, public health and morality that have the effect of 
curtailing religious rights, without any requirement that the laws are reasonable and neces-
sary in a democratic society. Article 14(2) does introduce tests of necessity and expediency, 
but, as we will see shortly,50 they do not operate as appreciable constraints on Parliament’s 
lawmaking powers. Furthermore, the tests do not apply to some of the grounds listed in 
 Article 14(2)(a), ostensibly authorizing Parliament to impose outright on the freedom of 
speech and expression ‘restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to 
provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence’.
In view of the manner in which these constitutional provisions are drafted, the Sin-
gapore courts have, to date, largely rejected the application of a proportionality analysis. 
In Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs,51 the applicants had been staging a protest 
outside a government building when they were asked by a police officer to disperse on 
the basis that they were causing a public nuisance contrary to the Miscellaneous Of-
fences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (MOA).52 The applicants commenced proceedings 
in the High Court against the Minister for Home Affairs and the Commissioner of Police, 
asserting that, by so acting, the police officer had behaved unlawfully and/or unconsti-
tutionally, in violation of their rights to free expression and assembly guaranteed by 
 Articles 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Upon the respondents’ application for the 
proceedings to be struck out on the ground that they were, among other things, scandal-
ous, frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process,53 the High Court considered 
whether the provisions of the MOA relied upon by the respondents to justify the police 
officer’s actions were constitutional.54
50 See the text accompanying n 57, below.
51 [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 (HC, Singapore).
52 Cap 184, 1997 Rev Ed: ibid 592, [13]. During the legal proceedings the Attorney-General, acting on 
the respondents’ behalf, identified the relevant provisions of the Act as s 13A or s 13B, which criminal-
ize the causing of harassment, alarm or distress to any person: ibid 605, [59].
53 ibid 589, [1].
54 ibid 599-600, [41].
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The Court contrasted Article 14(2), which authorizes Parliament to impose restric-
tions on the rights protected by Article 14(1), with Article 19(3) of the Indian Constitu-
tion. The latter permits the state to impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ on the right to as-
semble in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.55 In view 
of the absence of an equivalent phrase from the Singapore Constitution, the Court said 
that ‘there can be no questioning of whether the legislation is “reasonable”. The court’s 
sole task, when a constitutional challenge is advanced, is to ascertain whether an im-
pugned law is within the purview of any of the permissible restrictions. […] All that needs 
to be established is a nexus between the object of the impugned law and one of the 
permissible subjects stipulated in Art 14(2) of the Constitution.’56 Further, the Court 
noted that the phrase necessary or expedient appearing in Article 14(2) (‘Parliament 
may by law impose […] such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the 
interest of […] public order […]’) conferred on Parliament ‘an extremely wide discretion-
ary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards 
achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution. […] The pre-
sumption of legislative constitutionality will not be lightly displaced’.57 Since it was clear 
from the long title and ‘contents and purport’ of the MOA, and relevant parliamentary 
debates, that the Act was enacted to preserve public order, its constitutionality was un-
challengeable.58
The Court also stated it was ‘axiomatic that the terms and tenor’ of Article 10(2) of 
the European Convention are ‘very different’ from Article 14(2) of the Singapore Consti-
tution.59 Another ‘fundamental difference’ between English law and Singapore law was 
the applicability of the notion of proportionality, which ‘inter alia, allows a court to exam-
ine whether legislative interference with individual rights corresponds with a pressing 
social need; whether it is proportionate to its legitimate aim and whether the reasons to 
justify the statutory interference are relevant and sufficient’. The Court then comment-
ed: ‘Needless to say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the common 
law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative and/or an administra-
tive power or discretion. Nor has it ever been part of Singapore law.’60
It should be noted that these conclusions reached by the High Court were, in fact, 
obiter. The applicants submitted they were challenging the constitutionality of the man-
ner in which the police officer had exercised his powers and not the constitutionality of 
the MOA.61 They asserted that their right to free assembly entitled them to gather in a 
public place to conduct a protest which did not breach the peace.62 However, rather than 
assess the legality of the police action with reference to Article 14, the Court applied 
traditional administrative law principles, ultimately finding that the police officer had not 
acted in a Wednesbury-unreasonable manner.63 Thus, the Court is free to re-examine the 
reasoning in Chee Siok Chin in future cases.
55 ibid 601, [45].
56 ibid 602-603, [49].
57 ibid.
58 ibid 604, [55]-[56].
59 ibid 615, [86].
60 ibid 616, [87].
61 ibid 604, [57], and 625, [117].
62 ibid 622, [107].
63 ibid 618, [93], and 628, [125].
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The applicability of a proportionality analysis to Article 14 of the Constitution was also 
briefly considered by the High Court in a 2011 case, Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor.64 
The appellants, having been convicted by the District Court for making public addresses 
without obtaining licenses under the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act,65 submitted 
on appeal that, among other things, the Act was inconsistent with their right to free speech 
guaranteed by Article 14(1)(a). They relied on the Canadian case Vancouver (City) v 
Zhang,66 in which the Court of Appeal of British Columbia had found a by-law banning 
structures encroaching on or obstructing the free use of streets inconsistent with freedom 
of expression which was guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter, as it pre-
vented Falun Gong practitioners from placing billboards beside the street opposite the 
Chinese consulate.67 The Singapore High Court found the relevant provisions of the Ca-
nadian Charter to be ‘quite different’ from the Singapore Constitution’s provisions.68 Sec-
tion 1 of the Charter69 requires that restrictions minimally impair rights and freedoms,70 
but under Article 14 the Singapore Parliament is authorized to impose restrictions that it 
considers necessary or expedient in the interest of, inter alia, public order, and ‘[u]nlike 
the position in Canada, there is no requirement in Singapore for such restrictions to meet 
the minimal impairment requirement’.71 Though the Court only focused on one element 
of a proportionality analysis, it may be inferred that the Court felt that a proportionality 
approach is inapplicable to the Singapore Constitution due to textual differences between 
corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the Canadian Charter.
The Singapore courts have also not applied a proportionality analysis when dealing 
with cases relating to the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 15 of the 
Constitution. The main issue in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor72 was whether 
two pieces of subsidiary legislation that had been issued by the Government violated 
freedom of religion. Referred to in the judgment as ‘Order 123’ and ‘Order 179’, the first 
order had declared as undesirable all works produced by a named publisher of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses material, while the second had deregistered the Singapore Congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses as a society.73 The appellants, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, con-
ceded that their religion prohibited them from serving in the military, which meant that 
male adherents could not perform compulsory national service.74 The High Court held 
that it could not substitute its own view for that of the Minister for Home Affairs as to 
whether the Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted a threat to national security. Thus, the ap-
pellants could not challenge the legality of the orders.75 Since the Court essentially relied 
on a non-justiciability argument,76 it did not have to consider whether a proportionality 
64 [2011] 2 SLR 940 (HC, Singapore).
65 Cap 257, 2011 Rev Ed.
66 [2010] BCCA 450 (CA, BC, Canada).
67 Chee Soon Juan (n 64) 945-946, [6]-[7].
68 ibid 946, [7].
69 See the text accompanying n 2, above.
70 Chee Soon Juan (n 64) 946, [9], citing Oakes (n 4).
71 Chee Soon Juan, ibid 946-947, [9].
72 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP (n 14).
73 ibid 214-216, [1]-[7].
74 ibid 235, [62].
75 ibid 237-238, [68]-[70].
76 The point was more clearly expressed by the Court of Appeal in a subsequent decision, Chan Hiang 
Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294, which involved an attempt to 
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approach applied to Article 15(4) of the Constitution which, as mentioned earlier, permits 
the limitation of the right to freedom of religion by enacting general laws ‘relating to 
public order, public health or morality’.
Nonetheless, the Court addressed an argument which the appellants raised: whether 
there had to be a ‘clear and immediate danger to public order before the right of freedom 
of religion could be curtailed’.77 The phrasing of this test closely resembles the ‘clear and 
present danger’ or ‘clear and imminent danger’ test formerly applied to determine when 
the rights to freedom of speech, the press and assembly protected by the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution might legitimately be restricted.78 In any case, 
the judge was having none of it, holding that the test could not be applied in Singapore:
‘It cannot be said that beliefs, especially those propagated in the name of “reli-
gion”, should not be put to a stop until such a scenario exists. If not, it would in all 
probability be too late as the damage sought to be prevented would have transpired. 
In my opinion, any administration which perceives the possibility of trouble over re-
ligious beliefs and yet prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before 
taking action must be not only pathetically naive but also grossly incompetent.’79
The judge did not propose any alternative test with a standard more deferential to 
the Government, but his comments evince the view that it is inappropriate for courts to 
assess the reasonableness of legislation restricting freedom of religion.
The result of the Singapore courts not adopting a proportionality analysis in the Arti-
cle 14 and Article 15 cases described above is that they accept legislation as constitu-
tional if it relates to subjects the bill of rights specifies as grounds for restricting funda-
mental liberties, even if the legislation limits such liberties to a high degree.
III. Proportionality and Taciturn Constitutions
As we have seen, proportionality analyses have been applied by courts to bills of 
rights documents such as the Canadian Charter and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which permit rights to be restricted only on grounds that are, for instance, ‘rea-
sonable’ and ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.80 The Singapore 
Constitution, however, is an exemplar of a bill of rights that is more taciturn. For in-
stance, while Article 14(1)(b) guarantees to citizens ‘the right to assemble peaceably and 
without arms’, Article 14(2)(b) states:
‘Parliament may by law impose […] on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof or public order.’
quash a third piece of subsidiary legislation, Order 405/1994, banning the works of another publisher 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses materials: ibid 303-306, [28]-[36].
77 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP (n 14) 233-234, [59].
78 See Schenck v United States 249 US 47, 52 (1919) (SC, US) (‘clear and present danger’), and Abrams 
v United States 250 US 616, 627 (1919) (SC, US) (‘clear and imminent danger’), per Holmes J (dis-
senting). The test was later replaced by an ‘incitement to imminent lawless action’ test in Brandenburg 
v Ohio 395 US 444, 447 (1969) (SC, US).
79 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP (n 14) 233-234, [59].
80 Canadian Charter, s 1.
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Read literally, the provision suggests that any law enacted by Parliament which is 
necessary or expedient in the interest of national security or public order is constitu-
tional even if it restricts free assembly. Does the phraseology of bills of rights along the 
lines of Singapore’s therefore effectively rule out the application of proportionality? It is 
submitted there are a number of reasons why what we may call the Chee Siok Chin ap-
proach should not be followed.
A. The Significance of Rights
First, full effect ought to be given to the use of the word right in the Constitution. In 
a 1998 High Court decision, constitutional rights were distinguished from privileges in 
the following manner:
‘Constitutional rights are enjoyed because they are constitutional in nature. They 
are enjoyed as fundamental liberties – not stick-and-carrot privileges. To the extent 
that the Constitution is supreme, those rights are inalienable. Other privileges such 
as subsidies […] are enjoyed because the Legislature chooses to confer them – these 
are expressions of policy and political will.’81
If a ‘right’ can be overridden simply by the legislature enacting a restrictive measure, 
which is essentially what Chee Siok Chin suggested, then in reality it is more akin to a 
privilege than a right. Thus, if something is to be properly characterized as a right, with 
the fundamentality and inalienability that entails, the court must surely be capable of 
assessing whether the right has been legitimately abridged. This is where the proportion-
ality test comes to the fore.
The preceding is buttressed by the petitio principii argument employed by the Privy 
Council in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor,82 an appeal originating from Singapore. The 
provision their Lordships had to examine was Article 9(1) of the Constitution which, it will 
be recalled, states: ‘No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accord-
ance with law.’ The Public Prosecutor had argued that since Article 2(1) defines written 
law as meaning, among other things, ‘all Acts […] for the time being in force in Singa-
pore’, and law as including ‘written law’, so long as a deprivation of life or liberty has been 
carried out in accordance with an Act passed validly by Parliament, it is constitutional 
‘however arbitrary or contrary to fundamental rules of natural justice the provisions of 
such Act may be’.83 This submission failed to impress the members of the Board, who 
found that it begged the question:
‘Even on the most literalist approach to the construction of the Constitution this 
argument in their Lordships’ view involves the logical fallacy of petitio principii. The 
definition of “written law” includes provisions of Act passed by the Parliament of Sin-
gapore only to the extent that they are “for the time being in force in Singapore”; and 
Art 4 provides that “any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of 
this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the 
81 Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78, 102, [56] (HC, Singapore).
82 Ong Ah Chuan (n 32).
83 Ong Ah Chuan, ibid 721-722, [24]. The Public Prosecutor only conceded one limitation: that the Act 
of Parliament had to apply equally to all to avoid falling foul of the anti-discriminatory provisions of 
Art 12(1): ibid.
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inconsistency, be void”. So the use of the expression “law” in Arts 9(1) and 12(1) 
does not, in the event of challenge, relieve the court of its duty to determine wheth-
er the provisions of an Act of Parliament passed after 16 September 1963 and relied 
upon to justify depriving a person of his life or liberty are inconsistent with the Con-
stitution and consequently void.’84
Similarly, it is submitted that the statement in Article 14(2)(b) that ‘Parliament may 
by law impose […] restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient’ places on courts 
the responsibility of determining whether the law in question is a reasonable and propor-
tionate restriction on the right to assemble peaceably, and cannot be read as carte 
blanche for Parliament to impose any sort of arbitrary restriction.
Remarks made by the Court of Appeal in a 2010 case hint that the Court might be 
inclined to take a different view of what a right entails. In Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee 
Hsien Loong,85 the Court held that the defence of responsible journalism propounded by 
the House of Lords in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd86 is not part of the common law 
of Singapore and thus cannot be relied on as a defence to a defamation claim. It was 
unnecessary for the Court to decide if the constitutional right to free speech required the 
adoption of the Reynolds privilege since Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution applies only 
to Singapore citizens, which the appellants were not. Nonetheless, in an extended obiter 
statement, the Court set out various considerations that would have to be taken into ac-
count in future. In particular, it identified a number of ways in which freedom of speech 
and protection of reputation can be conceived in relation to each other. First, free speech 
can be regarded as a ‘preferential right’ taking precedence over protection of reputation, 
but capable of being outweighed in some situations – for instance, if the responsible 
journalism test is not satisfied. Secondly, free speech can be treated as a ‘fundamental 
right’ trumping protection of reputation except in limited circumstances, such as the 
malicious publication of a defamatory statement by the defendant.87 In the Court’s opin-
ion, though, the right to free speech in the Constitution is a ‘subsidiary right’ since Parlia-
ment is authorized by Article 14(2)(a) to impose restrictions on it.88
This view is correct only if the courts have no role in evaluating the fairness of Acts 
of Parliament, and, it is submitted, does not give proper weight to the concept of a right 
in the Constitution. If a right is fundamental and inalienable, it should only be limitable 
in narrowly defined situations which may be discerned through a proportionality analysis. 
We detract from the notion of a right if we permit it to be overridden too easily – perhaps 
a potential danger of the ‘preferential right’ approach.
84 ibid 722, [25].
85 [2010] 1 SLR 52 (CA, Singapore).
86 [1999] UKHL 45, [2001] 2 AC 127.
87 Review Publishing (n 85) 184, [287]-[288]. The Court of Appeal also noted (ibid 184, [289]) that free 
speech and protection of reputation can be ‘co-equal rights’, with the implication that the former does 
not enjoy any presumptive primacy over the latter. It felt that this was the position under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights because reputation is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as 
an aspect of the right to private and family life while freedom of speech is protected by Article 10. By 
stating it was mentioning this point ‘[f]or completeness’, the Court appeared to be suggesting that the 
co-equal rights approach is inapplicable to Singapore. The right to privacy is not expressly mentioned 
in the Singapore Constitution.
88 Review Publishing, ibid 183-184, [286].
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B. Treatment of Citizens and Non-citizens
It was mentioned earlier that a number of the fundamental liberties in the Constitu-
tion, including the rights to freedom of speech, assembly and association in Article 14, 
are only enjoyed by Singapore citizens.89 Thus, in Review Publishing, the Court of Appeal 
held that only Singapore citizens enjoy constitutional free speech, whereas non-citizens 
‘enjoy only common law free speech’.90 It would be natural to assume that since citizens 
have a constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech and expression, this right 
can only be restricted by Parliament for strong reasons and as minimally as possible. On 
the other hand, Parliament has a freer hand in enacting legislation that limits the com-
mon law right of free speech enjoyed by non-citizens.
However, a consequence of the Chee Siok Chin approach is that since the courts do 
not scrutinize the reasonableness of a legislative restriction once it is found to fall within 
one the enumerated grounds in, say, Article 14(2)(a), it is as easy for Parliament to re-
strict citizens’ constitutional right of free speech as it is to curtail non-citizens’ common 
law free speech. Thus, when a proportionality analysis is not applied, the reservation of 
free speech, assembly and association rights to citizens is effectively meaningless, since 
citizens enjoy no greater rights than non-citizens in this respect.
C. Avoidance of Arbitrariness
In a number of Singapore cases judges have asserted it is their duty to gauge wheth-
er the executive and legislative branches of government have acted arbitrarily. Chng 
Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs91 involved a challenge to detentions without trial 
under the Internal Security Act (ISA).92 The Court of Appeal accepted the appellants’ 
argument that Article 12(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees to every person equal-
ity before the law and equal protection of the law, requires Parliament’s legislative pow-
ers not to be ‘exercised in a manner which authorises or requires the exercise of arbitrary 
power, or the exercise of power in breach of fundamental rules of natural justice’.93 Fur-
ther, since Article 93 vests judicial power in the courts, it is for them to determine 
whether Parliament has exercised its discretion properly.94 As the Court put it: ‘[T]he 
notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has 
legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the 
exercise of discretionary power.’95
Chan Sek Keong J, who subsequently served as Chief Justice of Singapore between 
2006 and 2012, was one of the three judges contributing to the Chng Suan Tze decision. 
Sitting in the High Court later on, he reiterated the point made there in Jeyaretnam v 
Public Prosecutor,96 holding that if a statute vested absolute and untrammelled discretion 
89 See the text accompanying n 49, above.
90 Review Publishing (n 85) 171, [257].
91 [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (CA, Singapore).
92 Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed.
93 Chng Suan Tze (n 91) 551-552, [79] and [82], applied in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo 
Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, 313, [149] (HC, Singapore), and Yong Vui Kong v AG (n 12) 1233-1234, 
[78]-[80].
94 Chng Suan Tze, ibid.
95 ibid 553, [86].
96 [1989] 2 SLR(R) 419 (HC, Singapore).
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in a public official to deny a citizen a licence to hold a public event, this would be an 
unconstitutional deprivation of the citizen’s right to freedom of speech and expression.97 
He found the tests for constitutionality expressed in Indulal v State of Gujarat98 and 
Francis v Chief of Police99 – that legislation must provide adequate guidelines for the 
exercise of power, and that public officials must exercise power in accordance with legis-
lative policy and not for extraneous considerations100 – applicable to the Singapore Con-
stitution, even though Article 19 of the Indian Constitution and section 10 of the Consti-
tution of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, respectively the provisions in point in those 
cases, permitted ‘reasonable’ restrictions on the right to free speech.101
Afterwards, when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong v 
Public Prosecutor, Chan CJ expressed the view that legislation ‘of so absurd or arbitrary 
a nature that it could not possibly have been contemplated by our constitutional framers 
as being “law” when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental 
liberties’ would be unconstitutional.102
The courts have thus abhorred the arbitrary and unlimited exercise of executive and 
legislative powers, and consequently have asserted a jurisdiction to invalidate the ac-
tions of public authorities and laws having this effect. Such reasoning must also apply 
when judges are required to assess the constitutionality of legislation restricting funda-
mental liberties.
D. Originalist Arguments
In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal applied an originalist ap-
proach when interpreting the Constitution. The 1966 Constitutional Commission chaired 
by the then Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin,103 which had been appointed to formulate con-
stitutional safeguards for multiracialism and equality of all citizens,104 had suggested the 
introduction of an express prohibition of torture and inhuman punishment. The Court 
held that since Parliament had not included a provision to this effect when it amended 
the Constitution in 1969 to implement the Commission’s proposals, such a provision 
could not be inferred into Article 9 as Parliament had essentially rejected it.105
Is taking a proportionality approach to a clause such as Article 14 excluded by a 
similar originalist argument? The bill of rights in Singapore’s Constitution was derived 
from the fundamental liberties in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Malaysia itself had 
received them in a new constitution upon its independence from Great Britain in 1957. 
In February that year, a draft constitution with copious borrowings from the Indian Con-
97 ibid 429, [27].
98 AIR 1963 Guj 259 (HC, Gujarat, India).
99 [1973] UKPC 4, [1973] AC 761, 772-773 (PC on appeal from St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla). 
100 Jeyaretnam (n 96) 429-431, [28]-[30].
101 ibid 431, [31].
102 Yong Vui Kong v PP (n 31) 500, [16].
103 Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966 (chairman: Wee Chong Jin CJ) (Government Printer 
1966), reproduced in Kevin Y L Tan and Thio Li-ann, Tan, Yeo & Lee’s Constitutional Law in Malaysia 
and Singapore (2nd edn, Butterworths Asia 1997) Appendix D.
104 Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966, ibid 1, [1].
105 Yong Vui Kong v PP (n 31) 520-521 and 523-524, [64]-[65] and [71]-[72]. For commentary on this 
case, see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, ‘The Mandatory Death Penalty and a Sparsely Worded Constitution’ 
(2011) 127 L Q Rev 192.
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stitution106 was drawn up and submitted together with a report to Her Britannic Majesty 
and their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States by a Constitutional Commission 
under the chairmanship of Lord Reid, a member of Judicial Committee of the House of 
Lords.107 Article 10(1) of the draft constitution stated:
‘Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, subject 
to any reasonable restriction imposed by federal law in the interest of the security of 
the Federation, public order, or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defama-
tion, or incitement to any offence. [Emphasis added]’
While a majority of the Commission members did not comment specifically about the 
drafting of this clause, Abdul Hamid J made the following statement in a separate ‘note 
of dissent’:
‘Article 10. The word “reasonable” wherever it occurs before the word “restric-
tions” in the three sub-clauses of this article should be omitted. Right to freedom of 
speech, assembly and association has been guaranteed subject to restrictions which 
may be imposed in the interest of security of the country, public order and morality. 
If the Legislature imposes any restrictions in the interests of the aforesaid matters, 
considering these restrictions to be reasonable, that legislation should not be chal-
lengeable in a court on the ground that the restrictions are not reasonable. The Leg-
islature alone should be the judge of what is reasonable under the circumstances. If 
the word “reasonable” is allowed to stand every legislation on this subject will be 
challengeable in court on the ground that the restrictions imposed by the Legislature 
are not reasonable. This will in many cases give rise to conflict between the views of 
the Legislature and the views of the court on the reasonableness of the restrictions. 
To avoid a situation like this it is better to make the Legislature the judge of the rea-
sonableness of the restrictions. If this is not done, the Legislatures of the country will 
not be sure of the fate of the law which they will enact. There will always be a fear 
that the court may hold the restrictions imposed by it to be unreasonable. The laws 
would be lacking in certainty.’108
The report and draft constitution were studied by the British Government as well as 
by a Working Party in the Federation of Malaya, consisting of the High Commissioner, four 
representatives of the Rulers of the Malay States, four representatives of the Federation 
Government, the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General. Between 13 and 21 May 
1957, a delegation of the Working Party met British Government representatives in Lon-
don and reached agreement on all points of principle.109 In the meantime, the draft con-
stitution was reviewed by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel in the United Kingdom 
‘with a view to removing ambiguities and inconsistencies and, where necessary, improv-
ing its form’, taking into consideration recommendations of the Working Party.110 The 
106 R H Hickling, Malaysian Public Law (Pelanduk Publications 1997) 15.
107 See the Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission (chairman: Lord Reid) (HMSO 
1957) Appendix II. The report, but not its appendices, is reproduced as Appendix A of Tan and Thio 
(2nd edn) (n 103).
108 ibid 101, [13(ii)], cited in Tan and Thio (2nd edn), ibid 983.
109 Federation of Malaya Constitutional Proposals (Federation of Malaya White Paper No 41 of 1957) 
(Printed at the Government Press by G A Smith, Government Printer 1957) 1, [1]-[2].
110 ibid 1-2, [3].
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revised draft was then examined again at meetings of the Working Party in Malaya at 
which United Kingdom officials were present.111 Article 10 of the finalized draft,112 which 
was eventually enacted into law, now reads:
‘10. (1) Subject to Clause (2) —
(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression; […]
(2) Parliament may by law impose —
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it 
deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation, 
friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions 
designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly 
or to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any of-
fence; […] [Emphasis added.]’
It is not clear why the word reasonable was removed from the draft constitution pre-
pared by the Reid Commission. A white paper issued by the Federation Government 
merely said: ‘It has been agreed that the Federal Constitution should define and guaran-
tee certain fundamental rights, and it is proposed to accept the principles recommended 
by the Commission for inclusion in Part II of the Federal Constitution although there have 
been some changes in drafting’.113 Debates in the Federation legislature shed little light 
on the intended meaning or scope of provisions of the bill of rights:
‘As contemporary evidence of the meanings of controversial provisions the de-
bates on the Constitution in the Legislative Council [of the Federation of Malaya] are 
not too helpful […] No real discussion was had of its provisions. The Chief Minister 
restated some of them; but members were generally keenly conscious of the fact that 
they were expected to act favourably and quickly on the Constitution as a whole. 
Indeed, any desire to delay impending Merdeka114 by constitutional controversy was 
pointedly eschewed by more than one speaker, most of whom rose simply to defend, 
or occasionally attack, not to debate or expound or clarify any section of, the Consti-
tution. Many took the floor for the sole purpose of congratulating the Chief Minister.’ 115
Following Singapore’s own independence from Malaysia in 1965, the Wee Constitu-
tional Commission generally approved the fundamental liberties imported from the Ma-
laysian Constitution without detailed discussion of them. The Singapore Government 
made known its views on the report in Parliament on 21 December 1966 and legislative 
debates were held in March 1967. Neither the Wee Commission report nor the subse-
111 ibid 2, [3].
112 Proposed Constitution of Federation of Malaya (Printed at the Government Press by G A Smith, Gov-
ernment Printer 1957) 4.
113 Federation of Malaya Constitutional Proposals (n 109) 17, [53]. Hugh Hickling (n 106) 16, has com-
mented: ‘[T]he Reid Commission’s proposal that freedom of speech should be subject to “reasonable 
restriction” by federal law was abandoned, since the use of the word “reasonable” would presumably 
have permitted (or compelled) the courts to substitute their own tests in lieu of those provided by 
written law.’ This, however, is speculation.
114 Merdeka is a Malay word meaning ‘independence’. Used in this context, it refers to the independence 
of the Federation of Malaya – now the Federation of Malaysia – from the United Kingdom on 31 Au-
gust 1957, now celebrated as Merdeka Day.
115 Harry E Groves, ‘Fundamental Liberties in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya – A Com-
parative Study’ (1959) 5 Howard LJ 190, 214.
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quent Parliamentary debates on it provide assistance as to how Article 14(2)(a) of the 
Singapore Constitution should be interpreted.
In the circumstances, it is submitted there is a distinct lack of evidence as to why the 
word reasonable was omitted from the Malaysian predecessor of Article 14(2)(a). We do 
not know if Abdul Hamid J’s minority view in the Reid Constitutional Commission was 
found convincing by the framers of the Federal Constitution. In any case, it is doubtful 
that his view ought to be attributed to the legislators in the post-independence Parlia-
ment of Singapore who decided the provisions of the Singapore Constitution, since it was 
not expressly adverted to.
Indeed, when determining the constitutionality of legislation, the Malaysian courts 
themselves have not regarded the legislative materials examined above as mandating 
them to avoid assessing its reasonableness. In Dr Mohd Nasir bin Hashim v Menteri 
Dalam Negeri Malaysia,116 the Court of Appeal declined to give the bill of rights in the 
Constitution a ‘literal meaning’, deciding instead that the word reasonable should be read 
into Article 10(2)(b), thus permitting Parliament to impose only reasonable restrictions 
on the right to freedom of assembly. The Court held that this conclusion was, in part, 
demanded by the equality guarantee in Article 8(1) [Singapore’s Article 12(1)], which 
required that ‘not only must the legislative or executive response to a state of affairs be 
objectively fair, it must also be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved’.117 The 
approach taken by Mohd Nasir was approved by the Federal Court, Malaysia’s highest 
court, in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia.118
The fundamental liberties in a constitution should be interpreted generously119 and 
not in a manner that curtails rights unless the legislature has unambiguously expressed 
its intention to do so.120 Thus, it cannot conclusively be said that Parliament did not in-
tend to confer on the courts the discretion to consider the rationality of statutory restric-
tions on free speech, even if they fall within the exceptions set out in Article 14(2)(a). 
Another way of interpreting the Article, which is more consonant with the right to free-
dom of speech, is that the Constitution’s framers found it unnecessary to state that 
limitations imposed on the right had to be reasonable since it is inherent in rights inter-
pretation that the judiciary must assess the reasonableness of such limitations.121
116 [2006] 6 MLJ 213 (CA, Malaysia).
117 ibid 219-220, [7]-[9].
118 [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 340, [5] (FC, Malaysia).
119 ‘[T]heir Lordships would give to Pt IV of the Singapore Constitution [which contains the bill of rights] 
“a generous interpretation, avoiding what has been called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism’, suit-
able to give to individuals the full measure of the [fundamental liberties] referred to”’. Ong Ah Chuan 
(n 32) 721, [23], citing Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1979] UKPC 21, [1980] AC 319, 328 (PC 
on appeal from Bermuda).
120 See, for instance, Morguard Properties Ltd v City of Winnipeg (1983) 3 DLR (4th) 1, 13 (SC, Cana-
da); Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] UKHL 6, [1985] AC 1054, 1065; and Coco v The Queen 
(1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (HC, Australia).
121 See Michael Hor and Collin Seah, ‘Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and Expression in Sin-
gapore’ (1991) 12 Sing L Rev 296, 298; Michael Hor, ‘The Freedom of Speech and Defamation: 
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew’ [1992] Sing J Legal Studies 542, 544-549, particu-
larly 547: ‘[…] Art. 14 expresses a basic commitment to the freedom of speech. Parliament is, how-
ever, given the power to derogate from this in the interest of the exceptions mentioned. It must be 
implicit that the power of derogation cannot be so broad as to eclipse the basic commitment to free 
speech altogether. The Court must have the supervisory duty to see that such derogations do not 
get out of hand. It has the constitutional role of ensuring that the balance of free speech and, say, 
the protection of reputation is kept.’
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It is evident from these judicial pronouncements that, notwithstanding the tacitur-
nity of the Constitution, the courts do accept they have the responsibility of determining 
whether legislation is in fact absurd or arbitrary. It is submitted that the adoption of a 
proportionality analysis enables the courts to do just that. Conversely, if judges decline 
to assess the fairness or reasonableness of legislation, this permits Parliament to enact 
legislation that is arbitrary or disproportionate.
IV. Perceived Difficulties with Proportionality
Despite the foregoing, it might be said that courts ought not to use a proportionality 
analysis when interpreting fundamental liberties because it is too uncertain a test, and 
allows judges too much discretion to decide cases according to their personal predilec-
tions.122 It is also said that there is a risk of inconsistency when similar cases are decided 
by different judges. Moreover, there is a danger that requiring judges to weigh the inter-
ests promoted by fundamental liberties against other public interests may devalue rights.
These objections to proportionality stem from disquiet with the concept of balancing. 
Proportionality and the concept of balancing are intimately related but not coterminous. 
Balancing has been described as the process of analysing a constitutional issue by iden-
tifying the interests implicated by the case and reaching a decision by explicitly or implic-
itly assigning values to the interests.123 A proportionality analysis differs from mere bal-
ancing in that the former requires a judge to assess whether there is legal authorization 
for a restrictive measure, and its suitability and necessity. On the other hand, the fourth 
stage of proportionality analysis clearly involves a balancing exercise. The implication is 
that problems said to be associated with balancing affect proportionality as well.
A. Incommensurability
For two or more things to compared to each other, it is generally thought necessary 
that they are commensurable. In other words, they must be capable of being valued with 
some common yardstick or in some common currency. Commensurability is a key reason 
why the invention of money was such a groundbreaking innovation. Suppose I grow 
pineapples while my neighbour Ivy weaves cotton cloth. I would like to obtain fabric, and 
similarly Ivy would like some of my fruit. It is not impossible for us to agree on how many 
pineapples a yard of cloth is worth, for that is how bartering works. Nonetheless, if there 
exists a common currency which makes it possible for us to determine that a pineapple 
is worth a dollar and one yard of cloth two dollars, then it becomes easy to determine 
that I must give Ivy two pineapples for every yard of cloth she provides, and that one 
yard of cloth is more valuable than one pineapple.
It is said that one difficulty with balancing, and hence proportionality, is how to find 
a common currency with which to value the competing interests that arise in constitu-
tional adjudication. The scale has to be objective and external to the judge, otherwise it 
may simply reflect his or her personal preferences on the matter. Unfortunately, what 
often happens in practice is that judges talk in terms of balancing the costs and benefits 
122 It will be recalled that in Yong Vui Kong v PP (n 31), the Court of Appeal declined to apply a ‘fair, just 
and reasonable procedure’ test to Art 9(1) for this reason: see the text accompanying nn 29-33, 
above.
123 T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943, 945.
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of interests at stake, but in reality do not disclose the scale they are using, how the scale 
is determined, or how the interests are weighted and balanced against each other.124 For 
instance, in Attorney-General v Wain125 the issue arising was whether the offence of 
scandalizing the court, a species of contempt of court, was a proper restriction upon the 
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 14(1)(a) of the Singapore Con-
stitution. The High Court accepted ‘that this court has duty to uphold the right to free-
dom of speech and expression, and […] that this right must be balanced against the 
needs of the administration of justice, one of which is to protect the integrity of the 
courts’. However, without explaining how it was carrying out the balancing exercise, it 
went on to dismiss the submission that the public interest in protecting the courts’ integ-
rity should prevail only in cases involving dishonest or false criticism and where there 
existed a real and present danger to the administration of justice.126 The judge also said 
the ‘short answer’ to the respondents’ reliance on Article 14(1)(a) was Article 14(2)(a), 
which reads: ‘Parliament may by law impose […] on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a) 
[…] restrictions […] to provide against contempt of court […]’.127
Some of the best legal minds have been brought to bear on this issue, but not without 
cogent criticism. Robert Alexy focuses on the ‘concrete weights’ of principles, and ex-
presses preference for a ‘triadic’ scale – light, moderate and serious – for measuring the 
intensity of both a statute’s interference with a constitutional right, and the importance 
of satisfying a competing non-constitutional principle.128 If the interference with a consti-
tutional right is deemed by the judge to be ‘serious’ but the importance of satisfying a 
competing principle ‘not important’, then the restrictive measure is disproportionate and 
unconstitutional. Conversely, if the measure interferes with a constitutional right in a 
‘moderate’ manner but the necessity of satisfying a competing principle is ‘very impor-
tant’, the measure is proportionate and constitutional. In a ‘stalemate situation’129 where 
the interference with a constitutional right and the importance of a competing principle 
are of equal importance, Alexy does not accord the constitutional right any priority but 
submits that since neither enacting or not enacting the measure violates the proportion-
ality principle, the court should defer to the legislature on the wisdom of the measure.130 
The importance of rights and competing interests should be assessed in relation to the 
constitution, which provides ‘a common point of view’.131 However, Grégoire Webber is 
not convinced. He points out that unless the constitution provides guidance on how to 
determine degrees of interference, it is unclear how any recourse to it assists a judge. 
Furthermore, what is to say that a light interference with a constitutional right is to be 
regarded as of equal weight to a competing principle of low importance?132 Alexy’s tri-
124 ibid 972–976.
125 [1991] 1 SLR(R) 85 (HC, Singapore).
126 ibid 101, [56].
127 ibid 102, [59].
128 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, Oxford University Press 2002) 402 
and 408, n 64, cited in Grégoire C N Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing and the Cult of Constitu-
tional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 Can J L & Juris 179, 182-184. Alexy’s triadic model is based on 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: Webber, ibid 182.
129 Alexy, ibid 410-411.
130 Webber (n 128) 184.
131 Robert Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Iuris 433, 
442, cited in Webber, ibid.
132 Webber, ibid 195.
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adic model therefore does not really assist much in the identification of a common cur-
rency with which to balance competing interests.
However, too much is made of the necessity to value interests in terms of a common 
yardstick. For one thing, different yardsticks may be applicable to the same constitu-
tional issue for different purposes. A court should, for instance, consider if the interests 
proffered to it by the parties are accurately or inaccurately expressed, if they are logical 
or illogical, if they are relevant or irrelevant to the issue, and so on.133 The crux of the 
matter, though, is how the court is to assess the relative strengths of the competing in-
terests. Here it is important to recognize that the balancing task involves evaluating argu-
ments of morality and policy, and thus cannot be carried out with mathematical precision 
in the way pineapples and cotton can be valued in monetary terms. As Webber puts it:
‘To weigh or balance reasons may involve an examination of the advantages and 
disadvantages of available alternatives, but this is not to devise a common scale of 
evaluation, to assign a value, and to weigh in the technical sense. Rather, in holding 
the relevant reasons in one’s mind, one proceeds according to the reason that is, in 
one’s judgment, the most compelling and – in colloquial terms – one identifies that 
reason as the “weightier” one.’134
This is a point recognized by David Beatty: ‘Whether someone’s rights have been 
violated in law is not computed by some utilitarian, mathematical calculation. It is not 
about adding and subtracting people’s preferences. Nor is it a process in which factors 
are catalogued and quantified and balanced against each other.’135 Instead, he proposes 
that judges should focus on the facts of cases136 and ‘assess the legitimacy of whatever 
law or regulation or ruling is before them from the perspective of those who reap its 
greatest benefits and those who stand to lose the most’,137 such perspectives to be drawn 
from the parties to the proceedings and not the judges’ personal views.138 The parties’ 
perspectives are to be assessed against objective indicia. Where applicants are con-
cerned, these indicia include how important the impugned governmental action is to 
their ‘larger life stories’ in contrast to its benefits in others’ lives.139 As for the govern-
ment, it is relevant to consider whether the rights-limiting measure has been enforced 
with the same rigour in comparable contexts.140 By adopting a party-based perspective, 
Beatty reasons, judges are able to assess issues objectively and neutrally without relying 
on any particular philosophy or moral vision.141 Nonetheless, exaggerated claims by par-
133 John Finnis, ‘Commensuration and Public Reason’ in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incom-
patibility, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press 1997) 217, cited in Webber, ibid 198.
134 Webber, ibid 197.
135 David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2004) 171.
136 ‘Facts have a certainty, predictability, and reality about them that allows for more precise measure-
ment and analysis. Factual claims can be tested for how accurately they conform to an independent 
empirical world, as it actually exists.’ Beatty, ibid 73.
137 Beatty, ibid 160.
138 ibid 116, cited in Vicki C Jackson, ‘Being Proportional about Proportionality: The Ultimate Rule of 
Law. By David M Beatty. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004’ [review article] (2004) 21 Const 
Comment 803, 811.
139 Beatty, ibid 73.
140 Compare Beatty, ibid 66-67, cited in Jackson (n 138) 811.
141 Beatty, ibid 168.
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ties are justifiably rejected, so courts must assess for themselves how significant the 
measure is to the parties.142
Beatty’s arguments are not without difficulty. For one thing, he overstates the neu-
trality of his approach. Some element of subjectivity is inevitably involved when a judge 
determines if a party’s claims should be regarded as overblown, and the importance 
placed by the parties on the impact a legislative measure has on them. It is unlikely that 
the parties who benefit least and most from an impugned measure will always happen to 
be before the court, which means that in order to apply Beatty’s approach the court will 
have to engage in a degree of theorizing rather than merely considering the facts pre-
sented by the parties.143 Despite this, it is submitted Beatty’s views support the point 
that a proportionality analysis simply cannot be treated as a mechanistic act of measur-
ing up costs and benefits.
However, does our admission that arguments of morality and policy are not commen-
surable in the way apples and oranges are mean that proportionality is a recipe for in-
consistencies between cases since judges are essentially to rely on their intuition and 
personal preferences?144 Not necessarily so. Over time, as judges applying proportional-
ity analyses draw analogies from past cases and a stock of precedents is built up, it is 
likely that more ‘constraining and categorical’ rules will emerge.145 Here is an example. 
Suppose that Parliament enacts a law making it a crime to protest within a certain dis-
tance from Parliament House without a permit, which is scarcely if ever issued. Such a 
statute usually does not state how much weight a court should give to the competing 
interests of protecting the safety of legislators and Parliament property on the one hand, 
and freedom of expression and assembly on the other. Taking a proportionality approach, 
the court will have to identify the relevant competing interests of the parties and decide 
which are more important. Let us say the court finds it imperative that people should be 
free to gather and express political opinions near the seat of the state’s primary policy-
making body, and strikes down the law. It would thus have laid down a rule concerning 
the importance to be given to freedom of expression and assembly in the context of 
political communication which will be applied in subsequent comparable cases.146
It seems somewhat glib for Beatty to say that ‘[j]udges who let the facts – and the 
parties – speak for themselves usually have no problem identifying whose interests are 
paramount in any individual case. Judges know just by looking, just by sight, […] even 
when precise calibrations are hard to provide.’147 Ultimately judges have to lay all the 
relevant arguments on the table and decide which ones are weightier – more serious – 
and so deserve to prevail. This is no easy task, but once we accept that a degree of 
subjectivity is an unavoidable aspect of judicial reasoning present in many contexts, for 
example, when deciding whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose tort liability, and 
142 Beatty, ibid 160.
143 Webber (n 128) 188-189; Jackson (n 138) 820-825.
144 Jackson, ibid 836: ‘Case-by-case application of proportionality analysis, it might be argued, virtually 
invites ad hoc exercises of the judge’s own intuitions.’
145 ibid 838. Later on the same page, Jackson continues: ‘[P]roportionality analysis, if focused on a 
broader array of facts and institutional contexts, might lead either to the adoption of a more formal 
rule or a more contextualized standard.’
146 The example is adapted from one provided by Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and 
Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23 Melb U L Rev 
668, 702-705.
147 Beatty (n 135) 73, citing Jacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184 (1964) (SC, US).
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whether punishment fits the crime, the balancing of competing interests in constitu-
tional cases is perhaps not vastly different.
B. Devaluation of Rights
Another difficulty with proportionality is that it is said to devalue rights. This is re-
flected to some extent in the writings of Alexy and Beatty – for instance, Beatty regards 
proportionality as ‘[making] the concept of rights almost irrelevant’148 while Alexy re-
gards rights as no more than ‘prima facie requirements’.149 Essentially, the problem lies 
in the ‘cost’ of restricting a right being seen as a mere interest capable of being out-
weighed by the benefit of an opposing interest which the limiting legislation or adminis-
trative decision promotes.150 Related to this is the criticism that the balancing engaged in 
by the court is essentially what legislators do before they vote to enact legislation, so 
there is little reason for the court to depart from the balance already struck by the leg-
islature.151 Indeed, it has been suggested that proportionality analysis is best regarded 
as enabling the political branches of government to play a role in determining whether 
rights should be limited, and therefore courts should adopt a standard that is ‘relatively 
deferential to the necessary legislative judgment. […] [T]he question reviewing courts 
should ask is whether the legislative judgment that the constitutional criteria for an over-
ride have been satisfied in the particular context is a reasonable one, and not whether 
the judges agree with it.’152 Thus, a court should not judge a limiting measure directly, 
but ‘at one remove’,153 that is, it should consider whether it was reasonable for the leg-
islature to have enacted the measure, and not whether the measure is itself reasona-
ble.154
It is submitted, though, that when engaging in proportionality analysis in the course 
of constitutional construction, courts are not simply repeating a task best left to the leg-
islature but fulfilling a crucial, independent function. The presence of a bill of rights im-
plies that courts act as scrutineers, ensuring that proper regard has been given to fun-
damental rights when the restrictive measure was made. Because of their structural in-
dependence from the political branches, they are the appropriate branch of government 
to safeguard rights, particularly those asserted by minorities and unpopular groups.155 
This being the case, when applying a proportionality approach, judges should not be 
constrained to show deference to the prior choices of the political branches, but ought to 
carry out a full evaluation of whether the restrictive measure in question infringes rights 
to an unacceptable extent. With respect, the suggestion that courts should judge restric-
148 Beatty, ibid 160.
149 Alexy (n 128) 57.
150 Webber (n 128) 198, who calls this ‘[doing] violence to the idea of a constitution’. See also Aleinikoff 
(n 123) 986-987, noting that Ronald Dworkin has argued that ‘viewing constitutional rights simply 
as “interests” that may be overcome by other non-constitutional interests does not accord with com-
mon understandings of the meaning of a “right”’. Aleinikoff, ibid 987, citing Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 194 and 269.
151 Aleinikoff, ibid 984.
152 Stephen Gardbaum, ‘A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing’ (2010) 4 L & Ethics of Hum 
Rts 78, 99.
153 ibid 103, citing United States v Lopez 514 US 549 at 616 (1995) (SC, US), per Breyer J (dissenting).
154 Gardbaum, ibid 103-104.
155 Aleinikoff (n 123) 984-986.
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tive measures ‘at one remove’ sounds very much like Wednesbury unreasonableness, 
which is not an appropriate standard for rights adjudication.
To guard against inadvertent devaluation of rights, then, it is submitted that courts 
must give presumptively stronger weight to the interests sought to be protected by fun-
damental rights. This can be seen as one of the consequences of the presumption in 
favour of generosity that is generally accorded to bills of rights. Indeed, the third stage 
of the proportionality test seeks to achieve this. The test of necessity, by which a restric-
tive measure must be found to infringe rights as minimally as possible, requires judges 
to ensure that rights are not outweighed by any measure that may be characterized as 
‘reasonable’. However, there is a sound argument that when applying the necessity test 
courts should not insist that there is only one possible ‘least restrictive’ way of limiting a 
right, but accord some degree of deference to the executive or legislative body that in-
troduced the measure because ‘a judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not 
come up with something a little less “drastic” or a little less “restrictive” in almost any 
situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down’.156 Peter Hogg 
has expressed the view that permitting such a ‘margin of appreciation’ is required be-
cause judges may be ‘unaware of the practicalities of designing and administering a 
regulatory regime, and are indifferent to considerations of cost’.157 Thus, the stage three 
test is arguably better expressed as requiring a measure to restrict rights ‘as little as is 
reasonably possible’.158 To enable courts to apply the necessity test properly, it is for the 
parties praying that the restrictive measure should be upheld to adduce evidence show-
ing that any scheme limiting rights less would be administratively unworkable or costly 
to an unacceptable degree.
By the same token, to resist devaluing rights, when applying the fourth stage of a 
proportionality analysis – that is, when determining overall whether the benefits of a 
restrictive measure outweigh the costs of curtailing rights – courts must likewise start 
from the point that the measure is seeking to limit a fundamental right, which must be 
vindicated unless substantial contrary reasons have been given. Again, it is submitted 
that this is a natural consequence of the presumption in favour of generosity. It is also 
worth noting that proportionality in the narrow sense embodied in the fourth stage of the 
analysis is a tool enabling the court to weigh up the costs and benefits of rights-limiting 
legislation in a nuanced manner, taking into account the local context. Judges in different 
jurisdictions dealing with similar factual scenarios may well reach divergent conclusions.
V. Concluding Thoughts
While the manner of applying a proportionality analysis in rights adjudication differs 
among jurisdictions, four steps are typically involved: (1) a determination that the govern-
ment has legal authority to enact the restrictive measure in question; (2) a suitability test 
that establishes whether the means adopted in the measure and the policy objectives of 
the measure are linked by a rational relationship; (3) a necessity test that requires the 
156 Illinois Elections Board v Socialist Workers Party 440 US 173 (1979) (SC, US), 188-189 per Black-
mun J, cited in Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th edn, Thomson Carswell 2007) vol 2, 
148, § 38.11(b).
157 Hogg, ibid.
158 R v Edward Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713, 772 (SC, Canada) per Dickson CJ.
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measure to restrict rights as minimally as is reasonably possible in the circumstances; and 
(4) a balancing exercise in which the benefits of the restrictive measure are compared 
against the costs arising from the curtailment of rights. It is true that Singapore courts 
have not applied this complete four-stage proportionality analysis. However, the individual 
elements of the analysis are not foreign to constitutional interpretation in Singapore.
Stage 2 of the analysis requires a court to determine if there is a rational relation be-
tween the restrictive measure laid down by Parliament and the policy objectives that are 
sought to be achieved through the measure. This is identical to the key element of the ‘ra-
tional classification test’ that features in the jurisprudence of the Singapore courts con-
cerning Article 12(1) of the Constitution. In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor, the Court of 
Appeal said that a differentiating measure prescribed by legislation is only consistent with 
Article 12(1) if the classification underlying the measure is founded on an intelligible differ-
entia, and if the differentia bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by 
the law in which the classification is employed.159 This test is similar to the rational basis re-
view applied to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.160 The minimal impairment of rights requirement in Stage 3 finds ex-
pression in, among others, the Chng Suan Tze case, the Court of Appeal holding that since 
sections 8 and 10 of the ISA are exceptions to the fundamental liberties guaranteed by Ar-
ticles 9, 13 and 14 of the Constitution, they ‘should therefore be narrowly construed so as 
to derogate as little as possible from such fundamental liberties’.161
As for Stage 4, Singapore courts have on numerous occasions emphasized the need 
to balance fundamental rights against competing interests.162 Yet, there is scant evi-
dence in the cases that the courts meaningfully carry out the balancing by examining if 
the rights in issue have been justifiably displaced by proportionate measures. A position 
sometimes taken is that the balancing has already been carried out by Parliament and 
finds expression in provisions like Articles 14(2) and 15(4) that authorize Parliament to 
impose restrictions on rights in whatever manner they wish, and that it is not for the 
courts to engage in a separate balancing assessment. Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecu-
tor163 is illustrative of this mindset. The High Court said that freedom of speech is not an 
absolute right in any society, democratic or otherwise, and that ‘[b]roader societal con-
cerns such as public peace and order must be engaged in a balancing exercise with the 
enjoyment of this personal liberty. This is embodied in art 14(2)(a).’164 This approach 
159 Yong Vui Kong v PP (n 31) 536, [109], cited in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476, 
525, [124] (CA, Singapore), and in Lim Meng Suang (n 15) 126, [18]. See also Taw Cheng Kong 
(CA) (n 14) 507-508, [58].
160 See, for instance, City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc 473 US 432, 440 (1985) (SC, US): 
‘The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid, and will be sustained if the classification 
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’
161 Chng Suan Tze (n 91) 551, [79], citing Liew Sai Wah v Public Prosecutor [1968-1970] SLR(R) 8, 11, 
[11]–[12] (PC on appeal from Singapore), and Ong Ah Chuan (n 32) 721, [23].
162 See, for instance, Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1990] 1 SLR(R) 709, 732, [46] 
(HC, Singapore); Wain (n 125) 101, [56]; Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew 
[1992] 1 SLR(R) 791, 817-818, [61] (CA, Singapore); Jasbir Singh v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 
SLR(R) 782, 799, [46] (CA, Singapore); Chan Hiang Leng Colin (n 72) 235, [64]; Attorney-General 
v Lingle [1995] 1 SLR(R) 199, 203-204, [11] (HC, Singapore); Chee Siok Chin (n 51) 619, [96]; 
Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong (n 85) 176-179, [267]-[274]; and Attorney-General v 
Shadrake [2011] 2 SLR 445, 474, [56]-[57] (HC, Singapore).
163 [2003] 2 SLR(R) 445 (HC, Singapore).
164 ibid 450, [20] (emphasis added).
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seems out of line with the cases stating that the courts must guard against arbitrariness 
in lawmaking,165 and clearly acts as a severe self-restriction on the role played by the 
courts in constitutional adjudication. Nevertheless, it is heartening that in Review Pub-
lishing the Court of Appeal accepted that judges may have to strike a different balance 
between protecting fundamental liberties and upholding other public interests.166
Essentially, all the strands of a proportionality analysis are already present in Singa-
pore jurisprudence to varying degrees. What I have attempted to do in this paper is to 
justify why Singapore courts should take the next step to combine these strands into a 
unified proportionality analysis when determining whether the Parliament has a legiti-
mate interest in restricting a particular fundamental liberty through legislation. It is 
submitted that doing so would give full and substantial meaning to the concept of rights, 
and would avoid the ironic result that though the constitutional text guarantees that 
some rights are enjoyed only by Singapore citizens, there is in fact no difference in the 
way citizens and non-citizens are treated by the way in which the Constitution is cur-
rently interpreted. Furthermore, I argue that an originalist approach to interpreting a 
provision such as Article 14(2) does not bar the courts from adopting a proportionality 
approach.
In Chee Siok Chin, the High Court took the view that proportionality in judicial review 
is not part of Singapore law because it was also not traditionally part of the English com-
mon law. Rather, it is ‘very much a continental European jurisprudential concept im-
ported into English law by virtue of the UK’s treaty obligations’,167 and since ‘it is freely 
applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg’ it is ‘taken into account in 
Britain under the Human Rights Act 1998’.168 However, the source of the principle should 
not of itself hinder the Singapore courts from adopting it. Indeed, in the House of Lords 
decision of R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions169 Lord Slynn of Hadley was prepared to say that ‘even with-
out reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 the time has come to recognise that this 
principle [of proportionality] is part of English administrative law, not only when judges 
are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject to 
domestic law’.170
Admittedly, the provisions in the Constitution permitting Parliament to impose limita-
tions on fundamental liberties lack terms such as ‘reasonable restrictions’ and ‘restric-
tions necessary in a democratic society’, thus lending themselves to the idea that the 
courts must find to be constitutional whatever legislation falling within the enumerated 
grounds for limitation that the Parliament chooses to enact, regardless of how dispropor-
tionate or unreasonable it is. It is submitted that such an approach is undesirable. To 
quote Lord Denning MR out of context, the courts should interpret the Constitution ‘in a 
broad reasonable way, according to the spirit and not to the letter’.171
165 See Pt III.C, above.
166 See the text accompanying nn 85-88, above.
167 Chee Siok Chin (n 51) 616, [87].
168 ibid, quoting William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2004) 366.
169 [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295.
170 ibid 321.
171 R v Preston Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal, ex p Moore [1975] 1 WLR 624, 631 (CA, Eng-
land & Wales), cited in R v Barnsley Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal, ex p Atkinson [1976] 
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Although balancing is criticized because an overarching metric for assigning value to 
competing interests is lacking, it must be recognized that the moral and policy reasoning 
that constitutional adjudication involves cannot be carried out in a rigid mathematical 
fashion. In addition, the concern that proportionality leads to a devaluation of rights may 
be countered by consciously giving stronger weight to rights during the third and fourth 
stages of the proportionality analysis. This can be regarded as a specific application of 
the presumption in favour of generosity. 
Ultimately, the Singapore courts are likely to implement a proportionality analysis 
when interpreting the Constitution only if they conceive of their role in the legal system 
differently. They must see it as their duty to maximize the fundamental liberties guaran-
teed to people, and avoid literal, legalistic readings of the bill of rights. Indeed, there are 
signs that the courts have begun pulling back from the latter approach. For instance, in 
Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor the Court of Appeal stated on an obiter basis that 
colourable legislation (that is, a statute which usurps the courts’ role by amounting to a 
conviction of specific individuals), and ‘legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that 
it could not possibly have been contemplated by our constitutional framers as being 
“law” when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties’ 
can be struck down for non-compliance with Article 9(1) of the Constitution.172 This pro-
vision contains no express words from which the Court could have reached its conclu-
sion. The Court repeated this approach two years later in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-
General,173 when it laid down the correct interpretation of Article 4 which declares the 
Constitution to be the supreme law of Singapore and that ‘any law enacted by the Leg-
islature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this 
Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void’. On its face, the provision 
suggests that legislation predating the Constitution cannot be held invalid, but reading 
the constitutional text174 purposively the Court determined otherwise.175
Under the proportionality approach, judges will possess a fair degree of discretion in 
determining whether a restrictive measure should prevail against a right. This should be 
regarded as a strength and not a shortcoming of constitutional adjudication. Rather than 
shying away from assessing the reasonableness of laws, the judiciary should recognize 
that this discretion enables it to express independent, considered views on key issues of 
the day. This stimulates public debate on them, thus promoting deliberative democracy; 
and engages the political branches of government in a constitutional dialogue.
1 WLR 1047, 1048 [HC (QB), England & Wales]. Lord Denning was stating that a statutory tribunal 
should be allowed to interpret the statute empowering it to act with as little technicality as possible, 
without being subject to certiorari upon administrative law grounds.
172 Yong Vui Kong v PP (n 31) 500, [16]-[17].
173 Tan Eng Hong (n 159).
174 Articles 4 and 162 of the Constitution. The latter provision states: ‘Subject to this Article, all existing 
laws shall continue in force on and after the commencement of this Constitution and all laws which 
have not been brought into force by the date of the commencement of this Constitution may, subject 
as aforesaid, be brought into force on or after its commencement, but all such laws shall, subject to 
this Article, be construed as from the commencement of this Constitution with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with 
this Constitution.’
175 Tan Eng Hong (n 159) 506–507, [59]-[60].
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